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WoRKMBN's COMPENSATION-TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS WITHOUT PHYSICAL 
INJURY-Appellee and his co-worker attempted to lower a suspended scaffold 
• on which they were standing, whereupon the scaffold gave way and the co-
worker fell to his death. Appellee suffered only slight bruises on his leg, but 
as a result of seeing his fellow employee fall to his death, he sustained severe 
fright and shock which resulted in a traumatic neurosis preventing him from 
engaging in the normal duties of his occupation. The lower court awarded 
appellee judgment for permanent partial disability under the Texas Workmen's 
Compensation Law.1 On appeal, held, reversed. Appellee's condition was a 
mental disease and compensable under Texas law only if it resulted from a 
compensable physical injury. American General Ins. Co. v. Bailey, (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1954) 268 S.W. (2d) 528. 
Mental injuries sustained by accident and in the course of employment are 
compensable under most workmen's compensation statutes even though arising 
solely from fright and shock, and without previous or accompanying physical 
injury.2 The broad objective of workmen's compensation laws is to compensate 
1 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306 et seq. 
2109 A.L.R. 892 (1937). See especially Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 
187 N.W. 400 (1922) (death from shock due to accidentally causing fellow employee's 
death); Moray v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921) (loss 
of vision from hysteria caused by sight of electric flash); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 
177 Va. 204, 13 S.E. (2d) 291 (1941) (neurosis due to shock of electric flash and shot-
like sound); Hunter v. St. Mary's Natural Gas Co., 122 Pa. Super. 300, 186 A. 325 (1936) 
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workers for injuries arising from the increased risks of modern industrial society. 
Such objectives, consequently, cannot be effectively carried out if legislatures 
and courts insist on differentiating between physical and mental injuries in 
determining compensability. The Texas statute, by virtue of its peculiar 
language,8 has led the courts of that state to develop just such a distinction. 
Historically the courts have been reluctant to give legal recognition to mental 
injuries unaccompanied by "physical" damage,4 and have devised the familiar 
impact doctrine in negligence cases. The reasons underlying such a feeling were 
twofold. First, the courts were apprehensive of the difficulty of measuring 
mental damages; second, they feared the possibility of fraudulent claims. In 
answer, it has often been pointed out that the "physical" pain of a fractured 
arm, although equally as difficult to measure as mental pain, has long since been 
recognized as an element of damages.5 The fear of opening the Hoodgates to 
trivial and fraudulent claims is a real one, but it is not sufficient reason for 
denying recovery for genuine and serious mental injury. 
In the principal case, two findings by the court were crucial to its holding 
that the injury was not compensable under the Texas statute. First, the court 
had to, and did, determine that appellee's injury was a disease and not an injury 
as defined under the statute.6 As an injury, appellee's claim would have been 
compensable since all other requirements were present. 7 The term "injury," as 
defined in the Texas statute, has been held to mean damage or harm to the 
physical structure of the claimant's body, as distinguished from functional in-
juries which ostensibly affect only the bodily processes.8 Medical testimony 
describing appellee's condition as a mental disturbance or nervous illness led the 
court to characterize the injury as functional and thus not an injury under the 
statute. Assuming, as this court did, that the neurosis was not itself an injury, 
but was a disease, the court must then find that it did not naturally result from 
appellee's minor physical injuries. Such a finding was made. However, there 
is considerable doubt as to the court's decision that claimant's injury was not a 
personal injury per se under the statute. It is believed that a traumatic neurosis, 
(dog jumping on decedent's back caused death from fright without physical injury); Yates 
v. South Kirkby, Featherstone & Kemsworth Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538 (shock 
due to sight of injured fellow employee). 
8 Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8309, §1: ''The tenns 'injury' or 'personal 
injury' shall be construed to mean damage or harm to the physical structure of the body 
and such diseases or infection as naturally result therefrom." 
4 For a full treatment of this area, see Prosser, "Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffer-
ing: A New Tort," 37 M:rCH. L. REv. 874 (1939). 
5 McCoRMicx, DAMAGES 315-316 (1935). 
6 See note 3 supra. 
7Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 8306, §3b merely requires that the em-
ployee sustain an injury in the course of his employment. . 
s Southern Cas. Co. v. Flores, (Tex. Com. App. 1928) 1 S.W. (2d) 260; Fidelity 
Union Cas. Co. v. Martin, (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) 45 S.W. (2d) 682; Safety Cas. Co. 
v. Walls, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 117 S.W. (2d) 879. 
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such as the appellee suffered, is in fact a physical injury and not solely a state of 
mind, for fright affects the physical organism as definitely and as harmfully as 
a blow on the body. The physical effects of fright and shock have been dem-
onstrated to include deterioration of body cells, increased thyroid secretion, ac-
celerated circulation, increased respiration and body temperature, altered metab-
olism, and decreased digestion.9 The nervous system is a distinct part of the 
physical body, and if it is affected by fright to such an extent as to cause damage 
to the body or its processes, such an injury is in fact physical. It is common 
medical knowledge today that a sound body is never found with an injured 
nervous system. By strictly interpreting the statutory language and by ignoring 
medical knowledge, Texas courts have extended the anomalous impact doctrine 
to workmen's compensation cases.10 As stated above, such results stem from a 
genuine fear of "compensation neurosis" claims.11 However, even this latter 
type of neurosis, if bona fide and causally related to an accident arising out of 
and in the course of employment, should be compensated. If the neurosis is in 
fact fraudulent or non-existent, such facts can be discovered by competent 
medical observation. The difficulties involved in detecting and measuring bona 
fide "mental" injuries should not lead the courts to decisions which in effect 
defeat part of the remedial objectives of this legislation. 
Irving L. Halpern 
9 See Goodrich, ''Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage," 20 M:rcH. L. R:sv. 497 
(1922). 
10 See Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W. (2d) 345 (1948), 
where compensation was allowed for neurosis related to a minor foot injury. 
11 The courts have used this term to denote a genuine neurosis arising from an un-
conscious desire for compensation and anxiety over pending claims. 
